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Is democracy exportable?  A present-day political doctrine seems to recommend   
exporting democracy to those countries where diffused religious and social values do not 
allow the spontaneous growth of democratic institutions. In this paper  we present a 
model that allows us to study the dynamics induced by the exogenous imposition of 
democracy, when the society is dominated by antidemocratic preferences. We analyze the 
dynamics of the distribution of democratic values in a population where agents have 
heterogeneous preferences about democracy, distinguishing between fundamentalist-
antidemocratic agents and democratic agents (implicit references to Moslem societies are 
pervasive in this paper). Cultural traits and norms are acquired through a process of 
intergenerational cultural transmission and socialization. The driving force in the 
equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents; this depends on  
the distribution of democratic values in the population and on expectations about future 
policies affecting formal and informal institutions.  
 The main result is that when fundamentalism is sufficiently diffused in all institutional 
dimensions of social life, the imposition of formal democratic rules do not significantly 
affect social preferences. This occurs because the existing democratic types perceive their 
children’s “conversion” to fundamentalism as less costly than the utility cost perceived 
by fundamentalist types when their children adopt democratic preferences: so 
fundamentalists’ education effort dominates the dynamic of preferences. As soon as the 
exogenous imposition is removed  the system  will again converge to fundamentalist and 
antidemocratic institutions. We argue that shortsighted  behaviour  like this by 
democratic agents might be strongly correlated to  the level of economic development. 
On the other hand the model  shows how a cruel fundamentalist dictatorship can not 
wholly destroy democratic preferences in the population; the sole result is a fictitious 
homologation of manifested attitudes, with no preferences dynamics and the previous real 
attitudes immediately emerging as soon as dictatorship falls.  
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Introduction 
 
“Do individual-level attitudes play a significant role in sustaining democratic 
institutions at the societal level? At this point in history, democracy has a positive 
image almost everywhere, and the Albanians or Arabs are as likely to express a 
favourable opinion of democracy as are the Swedes or Swiss. But these 
favourable opinions are often superficial, and unless they are accompanied by 
deeper-rooted orientations of tolerance, trust and reciprocity, the chances are poor 
that effective democracy will be present at the societal level” (Inglehart-Welzel, 
200?). 
“Public attitudes are, of course, only one part of the democratization process. 
The course of democratization, at least over the short term, is more likely to 
depend on the strategic decisions of national (or international) elites than on the 
responses of citizens to a public opinion survey. But in the long run, a democratic 
system requires a democratic public to survive and function” (Dalton-Shin, 2003). 
Starting from these considerations  I developed a theoretical model to see 
whether democracy is exportable into a social-institutional framework where 
values of tolerance and civil liberties are not sufficiently accepted by population. 
When  I talk about Democracy  I have ignored issues such as elections and vote 
mechanisms because our goal is to determine the dynamics of the population’s 
preferences in terms of the ethical and moral factors that cause democracy to 
emerge spontaneously, rather than study how political preferences are expressed 
in democracies. 
The model analyzes the dynamics of the distribution of democratic values in a 
population where agents have heterogeneous preferences about democracy. 
Precisely  I distinguish between fundamentalist-antidemocratic agents and 
democratic agents (implicit references to Moslem societies are pervasive). 
Fundamentalists have a myopic vision of institutions and social life: they refuse 
any possible contamination of their behaviour induced by rules and customs 
which are not in accordance with their real attitudes. So the fundamentalist is 
intolerant, and in general opposed to giving civil liberties to people with different 
preferences. On the contrary, democratic agents have a more altruistic vision of 
the world: they want civil liberties for everyone, and accept diversity in all aspects 
of political and social life. 
  Cultural traits and moral codes are acquired through a process of 
intergenerational cultural transmission and socialization. The driving force in the 
equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which 
depends on the distribution of democratic values in the population and on 
expectations about future policies regarding formal and informal institutions.  
Our model studies the dynamics induced by an exogenous democracy 
imposition, when an important proportion of antidemocratic preferences is still 
present or even prevalent in society. The main result is that when fundamentalism 
prevails in all institutional dimensions of social life, the imposition of formal 
democratic rules do not significantly change social preferences. This occurs   4
because existing democrats perceive their children’s “conversion” to 
fundamentalism as less costly than the utility cost perceived by fundamentalists 
when their children adopt democratic preferences: so fundamentalists’ educational 
effort dominates the preferences dynamics. As imposition disappears the system 
will again converge to fundamentalist and antidemocratic institutions. This 
myopic behaviour in democratic agents might be strongly correlated with the 
level of economic development.  
As Zak (2003) has argued, changes in income, wealth distribution and social 
setting alter the individual’s perception of a political context; in particular, “civil 
liberties” become ever more attractive as wealth increases.  
In fact the literature seems to suggest that the educational effort of democratic 
agents, and intolerance towards autocratic regimes increases as economic 
development increases (see Feng-Zak, 1999; Burkhart-Lewis-Beck, 1994; 
Acemoglu-Robinson, 2000). 
On the other hand the model shows how a cruel fundamentalist dictatorship can 
not destroy democratic preferences in the population; the only result is a fictitious 
homologation of manifested attitudes, a sort of behavioural inertia, with no 
preferences dynamics and the previous real attitudes immediately emerging when 
dictatorship falls. 
This conclusion is paradoxical. Even more interestingly, if a fundamentalist 
regime allows some manifestation of democratic attitudes the quota of democratic 




The model proposes a simple overlapping generation framework to explain whether 
democracy is exportable into a population with heterogeneous agents having different 
preferences about democratic values. It defines two types of agents: fundamentalists and 
democrats. The agents are distinguished in relation to their own intensity of tolerance 
towards democratic values,  { } 2 1,t t T =  with  1 t  indicating a democratic type (with the 
highest tolerance) and with  2 t  a fundamentalist (with the lowest tolerance); clearly 
2 1 t t > . The probability of an agent being democratic is  { } t z t prob = 1 . Although we 
allow for different degrees of intensity in the acceptance of democratic values, we have 
assumed that only the extreme values are present in the society. Fundamentalist agents do 
not support democratic values and their preferences do not depend on institutional rules; 
they always choose to manifest their real attitude, consisting in a total opposition to 
democratic principles, and always isolate themselves by refusing any socialization with 
different types. The fundamentalist’s utility function is  ( ) 2 2 2 m m U U i − =  where  i m  is 
the attitude manifested, with  0 2 2 < − ∂ ∂ m m U i : so  2
* t mi =  is always chosen. 
On the contrary, democratic types choose to manifest an attitude that creates the 
minimum frictions  with both their real attitude  1 t and the formal and informal rules 
existing in society.   5
Democratic agents have to maximize their utility function  () A e m U U i , 1 1 θ − = , 
where  () 1 , 1 , 1 = e  and  1 2 t m t i ≤ ≤  the attitude declared,  ( ) 1 , , t
nf f θ θ θ =  the vector of 
institutions with  1 2 t t
f ≤ ≤θ  formal institutions,  1 2 t t
nf ≤ ≤θ  informal institutions and 
1 t  being the fixed real attitude of the agents. The term 
3
+ ℜ ∈ A  indicates a vector of fixed 
parameters assigning a degree of importance to each of the corresponding dimensions of 
( ) 1 , , t
nf f θ θ θ = . These parameters measure how strongly the specific institutional 
dimensions matter in the society from the democratic type point of view. In a 
fundamentalist dictatorship, for example, the imposed formal institutions  2 t
f = θ are the 
most important dimensions, while informal institutions and personal values are irrelevant, 
that is their importance can be supposed null. As we will see later, this hypothesis 
produces interesting results about the effect of fundamentalism on the dynamics of a 
population’s preferences. 
The utility function decreases in the “distance” between the manifested attitude and an 
element of institutional vector θ , that is  0 1 < − ∂ ∂ j j ie m U θ  where  3 , 2 , 1 = j , with 
j e  being the unit vector denoted  ( ) ( ) 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 ), 0 , 0 , 1 ( 3 2 1 = = = e e e . 
Given  ( ) ( ) A e m U m i
m
nf f , max arg ,
1
*
1 θ θ θ − =  as the optimal manifested attitude with 
an institutional vector  ( )
nf f θ θ θ , = , where the fixed parameter is understood to be  1 t . 
So the manifested attitudes are all possible  i m  between the minimum value  2 t  and the 
maximum  1 t
1.  
Given the utility function we can define the corresponding maximum value function 
( ) A V
nf f , ,θ θ  as  ( ) ( ) ( ) A A m U A V
nf f nf f , , , , ,
*
1 θ θ θ θ θ − =  with 
( ) 0 , , > ∂ ∂
f nf f A V θ θ θ  and  ( ) 0 , , > ∂ ∂
nf nf f A V θ θ θ ; that is, democratic agents 
obtain higher values of satisfaction if institutions are close to their real attitude. Clearly 
( ) 0 , ,
*
1 > ∂ ∂
f nf f A m θ θ θ  and  ( ) 0 , ,
*
1 > ∂ ∂
nf nf f A m θ θ θ . So  () θ V  is strongly 
increasing in θ  that is  ( ) ( )
b a V V θ θ >  if 
b a θ θ ≥  and, for a fixed set of  parameters, we 
can write the following relation:  ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 1 1 , , , t t V t t V t t V j i ≥ ≥  for all  j i ≠ . Moreover 
()() 1 2 2 1 , , t t V t t V ≥  if formal institutions are more important than informal institutions 
with equality when they have identical relevance
2. Likewise,  ( ) () k i j i t t V t t V , , =  if 
nf θ  
                                                 
1An individual’s democratic orientation may not correspond to the attitude she manifests; the 
relationship between pro-democratic beliefs and effective behaviour strongly depends on the 
institutional context (similar considerations are in  Dalton-Ong, 2003). 
2A possible form of the utility function can be the weighted  norm
2
j A j m U θ − − =   2 , 1 = j  
where  j A   is a diagonal matrix of salience terms  ( ) ( ) 33 22 11 , , a a a A Diag j =  with  1)  0 ≥ ii a   
if  1 = j  and  2)  0 , 0 22 11 = = a a  and  0 33 ≥ a  if   2 = j .  It can be easily shown that if 
22 11 a a ≥  then  ( )() 1 2 2 1 , , t t V t t V ≥ .   6
has no weight and  ()( ) i j i k t t V t t V , , =  if 
f θ  has no weight; this is because the 
institutional dimension with no weight does not affect the agent’s choices. 
 
 
Dynamics of preferences 
 
Now we expand the model by adding the temporal dimension and considering an 
overlapping generation mechanism by which parents and society transmit cultural traits 
to future generations. Each agent lives two periods. In the first period she is a child and 
she has no specific preferences; in the second she becomes an adult with a definite 
attitude toward democratic values and chooses to manifest the attitude maximizing her 
utility function. Preferences are transmitted to the child by the education effort of the 
parent (vertical transmission) and by the cultural influence of society (oblique 
transmission)
3: if the child does not learn from the parent, she adopts the preferences of a 
randomly chosen adult. Parents want to maximize their child’s future well-being, but they 
evaluate the welfare of their children through their own preferences structure according to 
the hypothesis of imperfect empathy (see Bisin-Verdier, (2000, 2001)). Empathy is the 
psychological process that consists in directly absorbing the emotional condition of 
another person; the imperfection we attribute to this process consists in a sort of myopic 
behaviour of a parent who evaluates the future choices of her child without considering 
the child’s effective attitude but exclusively using one’s own.  
To formalize these concepts suppose at time t each adult of type  i t  ( ) 2 , 1 = i  has a child 
and chooses an effort 
t
i τ  to educate her. This effort equates the probability the child will 
adopt parent’s preferences ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤
t
i τ . Now, letting 
j i
t P
,  be the transition probability 
that a child of parent  i t  is of type  j t  and considering a democratic adult, we can write 
( ) t t t t z P
1 1 1 , 1 1 τ τ − + =  and  ( )( ) t t t z P − − = 1 1
1 2 , 1 τ  where  t z  is the proportion of 
democratic adults at time t. Similarly, for the fundamentalist adult we get 
( )() t t t t z P − − + = 1 1
2 2 2 , 2 τ τ  and  ( ) . 1
2 1 , 2
t t t z P τ − =  
Given these probabilities, we can characterize the dynamic behaviour of  t z  by the 
following difference equation:  ( )
1 , 2 1 , 1
1 1 t t t t t P z P z z − + = +  where substituting for 
1 , 1
t P  and 
1 , 2
t P  the dynamic equations becomes  ( )( ). 1
2 1
1 t t t t t t z z z z τ τ − − + = + . 
This difference equation has two unstable fixed points,  0 = z and  1 = z , and a unique 
stable fixed point 
* z z =  with 
2 1 τ τ =  (Proof: see appendix). 
As we can see, the dynamics of the population’s preferences depend on the parent’s 
educational effort. A parent of type  i t  chooses the educational effort  [] 1 , 0 ∈ τ  that 
maximizes 








t C U P U P τ θ θ β − + = Γ
, , , ,  
 
                                                 
3 On the concepts of vertical and oblique transmission of cultural traits see Cavalli-Sforza, (1996) 
and Cavalli-Sforza, Fieldman, (1981).   7
where  β  is the discount rate,  ( ) t C τ  the cost of educational effort and  ( )
h k j i U
, , θ  the 
expected utility from the economic action of a child of type  j t  as perceived by a parent 
of type  i t  when she expects  ( ) 1
, , , t t t k h
k h = θ . 
Assume that  ( )
i C τ  is twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex with 
() 0 0 = C ,  () 0 0 = ′ C  and that for all τ   0 > ′ > ′ ′ C C
4. In order to assess 
j i U
,  a parent of 
type  i t  uses his own payoff structure (imperfect empathy), therefore, given 
k h, θ  we must 
have   ( ) ( )
k h j i k h i i U U
, , , , θ θ ≥ , that is each parent prefers a child that adopts her own 
preferences.  
Solving the maximization problem and suppressing the time indicators, we obtain the 
following conditions: ( )( ) ( )
1 2 , 1 1 , 1 1 τ β C z U U ′ = − −  and  ( ) ( )
2 1 , 2 2 , 2 τ β C z U U ′ = −  by 
which, using the implicit function theorem, we get  ( )
()
0 1





























The educational effort of type  1 t  decreases as the proportion of democratic agents 
increases. In fact, higher values of z mean a higher probability the child assumes the same 
preferences as the parent simply by socializing with a member of society; this induces the 
parent to reduce the educational effort. Similarily, if the proportion of democratic agents 
increases, the fundamentalist parents must intensify their educational effort. 
Moreover, fundamentalists have a total aversion to socialise with types manifesting 
different attitudes; they do not tolerate any deviation from their moral codes, and evaluate 
such a deviation as highly expensive. On the contrary, conversions of different types to 
their preferences has a very high value for them. To simplify the analysis we can state the 
following formal definition of imperfect empathy: 
 
- Definition - 
 Imperfect empathy with total socialization aversion: for the type  2 t , 
() 2 1 2
1 , 2 m t U U − =  given the belief  ( ) A e m U t i , max arg 1 1 θ − =  for all θ  and 
2
*
1 m m ≠  (expensive deviation hypothesis). On the contrary, if  2
*
1 m m =  then 
() 2 2 2
1 , 2 m m U U − =  (hypothesis of highest utility from conversion ). 
 
Formal and informal institutions 
 
In this model we distinguish between formal and informal institutions, according to 
North’s definition (North, 1990), and formalize the concept by using the vector 
( ) 1 , , m
nf f θ θ θ = . According to this definition formal institutions are the political, social 
and economic regulations in force; they usually emerge to increase the effectiveness of 
                                                 
4 Note that  () τ C  must be sufficiently convex so that the solution of the maximization problem is 
1 < τ .   8
habits, customs and religious traits (informal institutions) diffused in the population. So 
we can suppose that in each period informal institutions represent the level of democratic 
values of prevailing type. If the fraction  t z  is larger than  2
1 , then democratic agents are 
in the majority and their attitudes constitute informal institutions, and  1 t
nf = θ . On the 
other hand when  t z  is less than  2
1 , the level of 
nf θ  will be strongly affected by 
fundamentalist customs and  2 t






















z θ   
 
The mechanism we have introduced allows us to formalise the idea that democratic 
habits and beliefs spread when there is not sufficient social aversion to oppose them.  
On the other hand institutions reduce the cost of individual convictions, so ideologies, 
religions and moral codes can produce very important institutional alterations (North, 
1990). This consideration allows us to assume that when formal institutions freely evolve 
(that is without exogenous imposition) they will tend to coincide with informal rules as 
time goes by, that is for a fixed level of 
nf θ , 
nf f θ θ →  during a finite time t. 
 
 
The steady states 
 
We can now characterize the steady states according to the expected level of formal and 
informal institutions.  
Lemma 1 
Given an expected institutional vector ( )
nf f θ θ ,  then 
2 1 τ τ <
>  when  ( )
nf f










, 1 , 2 2 , 2 2 , 1 1 , 1
2 , 1 1 , 1
*
U U U U
U U
z nf f nf f





θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ  
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
Lemma 2 
Each institutional combination generates a unique and different stable steady state 
) , (
*
, j i j i t t z z = .  
However, given the assumptions on institutions we only consider institutional situations 
( )
nf f θ θ ,  with  2 1,t t
f = θ  and  2 1,t t
nf = θ ; so the following relations hold: 
1)  2 , 1 1 , 1 z z ≥ ,  1 , 2 1 , 1 z z ≥  and  2 , 2 1 , 1 z z ≥ ; 
2)  1 , 2 2 , 2 z z ≤  and  2 , 1 2 , 2 z z ≤ .   9
3)  1 , 2 2 , 1 z z >
<  where equality holds if different dimensions of institutional vector have the 
same relevance. 
 (Proof: see appendix) 
Given that formal institutions tend to coincide with informal institutions, we can 
consider as a possible final state the points  j i z ,  with  j i = . 
Proposition 1 (exporting democracy): assume 
1 , 2 2 , 2 2 , 1
2 , 2
1 , 1
2 , 2 U U U U − < − ,  2 , 2 z as the 
initial point, and the exogenous imposition of democracy such that  1 t
f = θ :  1) if 
2
1
2 , 1 > z  then  t z  will converge to  1 , 1 z  (democracy consolidates). 2) if  2
1
2 , 1 < z  then  t z  
will converge to  2 , 1 z , but when the imposition disappears  t z  will go back to  2 , 2 z  (fragile 
democracy).  
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
Proposition 2 (fragility of democracy): assume 
1 , 2 2 , 2 2 , 1
1 , 1
1 , 1
1 , 1 U U U U − > − ,  1 , 1 z  as the 
initial point and the imposition of fundamentalist dictatorship such that  2 t
f = θ : 1) if 
2
1
1 , 2 < z  then  t z  will converge to  2 , 2 z  (fundamentalist dictatorship consolidates). 2) if 
2
1
1 , 2 > z  then  t z  will converge to  1 , 2 z , but when the imposition disappears  t z will go 
back to  1 , 1 z  (fragile fundamentalist dictatorship).  
(Proof: see appendix) 
 
By proposition 1, “democracy is exportable” only if the “transitory” steady state  2 , 1 z  is 
sufficiently high; this occurs when 
1 , 2 2 , 2 2 , 1
2 , 1
1 , 1
2 , 1 U U U U − > − . Such a relationship fixes 
the idea that the net “utility gains” of a democratic type from having a child with her own 
preferences must be higher than the corresponding net “utility gains” of a fundamentalist 
parent. Deviations from democratic values must be perceived as very expensive. So 
imposing formal institutions can induce a change in customs but only if the agent sustains 
democratic values sufficiently. As we have reported in the introduction, nowadays 
democracy has a positive image almost everywhere, but a deeper analysis shows as these 
favourable opinions are often superficial, and accompanied by deeper-rooted orientations 
of religious and political intolerance. Such a situation makes the “export of democracy” 
very vulnerable to fundamentalist contaminations; probably democracy can not sustain 
itself. Thus, when deviations are not expensive, the imposed democracy only produces a 
temporary change in formal institutions 
f θ , without systematically affecting social and 
cultural norms 
nf θ . In this case democracy is fragile and permitting a free evolution of 
institutions will destroy the imposed democracy. The rise of Nazi dictatorship is an 
emblematic historical example of an imposed democracy changing into a cruel 
fundamentalist dictatorship. In terms of our model, the disastrous economic conditions 
under the fragile Weimar Republic and the hierarchic and paternalistic authoritarian 
structure of the German family and society (informal institutions) created the conditions 




2 , 1 U U − , opening the way for a rapid increase 
of fundamentalist education effort and the consequent diffusion of undemocratic values   10
(convergence toward the state  2 , 2 z ). The brand-new German democracy turned out to be 
extremely fragile; in fact democratic elections confirmed full power for the 
fundamentalist Nazi party transforming a Democracy in a cruel dictatorship (see Dalton-
Ong, 2003 and Verba, 1965).  
In accordance with Feng-Zak (1998), proposition 2 shows that a consolidated 
democracy might change towards undemocratic forms of governments. In fact, when 
2
1
1 , 2 < z  and informal democratic institutions do not receive sufficient support 
(relevance) compared with formal institutions (that is 
1 , 2 2 , 2 2 , 1
1 , 2
1 , 1
1 , 2 U U U U − < − ), the 
exogenous imposition of fundamentalist reform of formal institutions (perhaps induced 
by poor economic conditions) can generate a tragic political change in regime, 
characterized by the end of democracy and the rise of fundamentalist dictatorship.  
In particular the model shows that democracy can fall spontaneously even where there is 
no exogenous imposition of fundamentalist preferences. Formalizing, let’s define  a 
2
1 > z  so that for all  z zt < < 2
1 , if  ( ) 2 t E
f = θ  with  2
1
1 , 2 < z , then  () 2
1
1 < + t t z z  and 
suppose we start from  z z < < 1 , 1 2
1 . By proposition 2, with  ( ) 2 t E
f = θ  we see that in the 
first period  t z  will converge to  2
1
1 , 2 < z  overcoming  2
1 = z ; but in the second period, 
2
1 < z  so informal institutions change and the system spontaneously converges to  2 , 2 z . 
Even with consolidated democratic institutions, if the proportion of democrats is not 
sufficiently large, it is sufficient that their expectations are pessimistic with regards to the 
immediate future of formal institutions to produce a spontaneous convergence toward 
fundamentalist equilibrium (self-fulfilling expectations). It is reasonable to assume that 
this pessimism may be generated by exogenous factors inducing political uncertainty 
such as terrorism, wars, globalization etc
5.  
On the other hand the model allows us to study whether an imposed and cruel 
dictatorship, which destroys any possibility to freely manifest different preferences (an 
emblematic example was the recent Taliban dictatorship in Afganistan), can produce such 
a significant change in social preferences that after some time all individuals are 
fundamentalist and the dictatorship has the full support of the population. History seems 
to tell us that dictatorships can not systematically affect people with different preferences; 
cultural groups tend to maintain their originality even if they are constrained to manifest 
different attitudes during the dictatorship. To formalize this idea, let us suppose the 
imposition of  2 t
f = θ  and a reduction of the relevance of both 
nf θ  (informal 
institutions) and  1 t  (personal democratic attitude)
6, so that the optimal choice for a 
                                                 




~ < < z z   with  2
1
2 , 1 > z such that if at time t  ( ) 1 t E
f = θ  then  ( ) 2
1
1 > + t t z z . Also in this 
case, if democratic agents expect a change of regime (from dictatorship to democracy), such a 
change occurs generating a virtuous convergence toward more democratic institutions. 
6 The reduction of relevance can be justified by the very high costs an agent sustains if she shows 
attitudes other than dictatorial group’s preferences.   11
democratic type is  ( ) 2
*
1 , m m
nf f ≅ θ θ
7. In this situation we do not observe any 
significant dynamics in population distribution of types because 
j i i i U U
, , ≅  for each 
type of agent and so, by the maximization problem,  0 ) ( =
i C τ   2 , 1 = i . Dictatorial 
regimes can not wholly “tame” population; in the long run the former distribution of 




This paper demonstrates that the effort by which individuals transmit democratic 
preferences to future generations plays a fundamental role in generating transition from 
fundamentalist autocracy to democracy, particularly when democracy is exogenously 
imposed. It is not sufficient to have democratic attitudes; these attitudes must be strongly 
supported by the deeper-rooted idea that fundamentalism produces very high social costs.  
In particular the novel aspect of the model we have presented is the dynamic 
implications on a population’s democratic attitudes induced by exogenous imposition of 
formal rules.  
Exporting democracy seems to be the new dominant doctrine in international politics: 
democratic countries feel they have to induce democratic reforms in the undemocratic 
countries, even to the extent of using imposition. However a lot of papers underline both 
the relevance of diffused democratic attitudes among agents and a sufficient level of 
economic well-being as necessary prerequisites to assure the consolidation of democratic 
reforms (Zak, 2003, Barro, 1996, 1999). Empirical works give evidence of both a 
prevailing presence of undemocratic regimes in poor countries and of a disinclination of 
the poor to engage in public demonstrations against undemocratic politicians (Drezen and 
Sen, 1989); so it might be very difficult to export democracy to poor and undemocratic 
countries.  
Thus, in terms of our model, we have justifiably correlated the relevance of democratic 
values to the level of economic and institutional development, in the sense that 
transformations of the economic environment changes the incentives to manifest 
democratic attitudes and claims for civil liberties. This hypothesis has interesting 
consequences on the dynamics of the population’s democratic preferences:  
1) exporting civil liberties when democratic values are not sufficiently supported, 
creates fragile democracies, in the sense that no significant change in people’s attitudes 
and expectations occurs; so democracy can not sustain itself efficiently in the long run. In 
a situation like this a sustainable democracy can only flourish if economic and social 
development are at a sufficiently high level to support the increase of civil liberties: as in 
Zak (2003) the increase of wealth induces democrats to fight for their values (the 
relevance of democratic values increases) imposing virtuous dynamics in the population’s 
preferences which will transform formal institutions and produce a consolidated 
democracy
8;  
                                                 
7 Relevance may be reduced by promising violent actions (segregation, tortures, arrest, 
deportations, sentence to death etc.) for example against all individuals manifesting preferences 
other than fundamentalism.  
8 This is the so called  “prairie fire effects”, by which  a small change in economic fundamentals 
induces a large change in political instability (Zak, 2003 and Kuran, 1989).   12
2) Dictatorship shows the same fragility as democracy when the incentives to claim 
democracy increase. In extreme cases, even if the fundamentalist dictatorship imposes a 
tragic reduction of the relevance of democratic values, we observe a total absence of 
population’s dynamics: all drastic attempts to destroy democratic attitudes will produce 
the effect of a behavioural inertia allowing them to survive and remerge when 
dictatorship ends. Paradoxically, the effects of fundamentalism on the dynamics of 
people’s preferences is stronger if the manifestation of more democratic attitudes is not 




 Consider the dynamic equation of population  ( )( )
2 1
1 1 t t t t t t z z z z τ τ − − + = + ; we note 
that it has three rest points: i)  0 = z , ii)  1 = z  and iii) 
* z z = with 
2 1 τ τ = .  
Deriving the dynamic equation with respect to  t z  we obtain 
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  given that ( ) ( ) 0 1
1 = ⇒ = τ t z  
then points  0 = z  and  1 = z  are not stable. 
To evaluate the stability of point  ( )
nf f z θ θ ,
* , rewrite the derivative of dynamic 
equation as 
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Evaluating this derivative in 
∗ = z zt , that is considering 
2 1 τ τ =  and given 
C C ′ ′ < ′ τ ∀  we have 
( )
() () 1 , 0 1























 and conclude that 
∗ = z zt  is locally stable. ■ 
Following the same arguments we can show that with  1 θ θ =
e  the unique stable steady 
state is  1 = z . In fact, given  0
2 = τ , the dynamic equation becomes   13
() ( )
1






1 1 − + =
∂
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Conversely, the other rest point  0 = z is not stable, given that  () 1 1
1
0










Lemma 1: Given the imperfect empathy hypothesis and preferences of the 
fundamentalist agent  ( ) ( )
e e U U θ θ
2 , 1 1 , 1 >  and  ( ) ( ) 2 1
1 , 2 2 , 2 0 m m U U − > ; consequently, 
by the first order condition of parent’s maximization problem, each type of agent chooses 
a positive educational effort,  0
1 > τ  and  0
2 > τ . 
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e z θ
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,  the utility a parent of type  1 t  has from the action of her 
child of type  j t  when formal and informal institutions are respectively  h
f t = θ  and 
k
nf t = θ  ,  2 , 1 , = k h  and  2 , 1 = j . Moreover, let  k h z ,  be the steady state when  h
f t = θ  
and  k
nf t = θ . Then  j i k h z z , , ≥  if 
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where equality holds if 
nf θ  has null relevance. Following the same procedure we can 
show that  1 , 2 1 , 1 z z ≥  ,  2 , 2 1 , 1 z z ≥  ,  2 , 1 2 , 2 z z ≤  ,  1 , 2 2 , 2 z z ≤ . The relation between  2 , 1 z  and 
1 , 2 z  depends on the relative importance of formal and informal institutions; thus 








2 , 1 U U U U − > −  which is verified only if formal institutions are 
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Proposition 1: by imposing 
1 , 2 2 , 2 2 , 1
2 , 2
1 , 1
2 , 2 U U U U − < −  we have the starting point 
2
1
2 , 2 < z ; with the imposition  1 t
f = θ , by lemma 1 
2 1 τ τ >  and  t z  will tend to 
converge at  2 , 1 z :  1)  if  2
1
2 , 1 > z  then  t z will overtake  2
1 = z  and by assumption on 
institutional dynamics  1 t
nf → θ ; at this point the new attractor will be  2 , 1 1 , 1 z z > ; 2) if 
2
1
2 , 1 < z  then  t z will monotonically converge to  2 , 1 z ; when the imposition ends we again 
have  2
1 < z  and by assumption on institutional dynamics  2 t
f → θ ; at this point the new 
attractor will be  2 , 2 z .■   14
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at  1 , 2 z : 1) if  2
1
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1 = z  and by assumption on institutional 
dynamics  2 t
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by assumption on institutional dynamics  1 t
f → θ ; at this point the new attractor will be 
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